India’s Clean Energy Movement: A Case for Hope

Climate change mitigation is a wicked problem to solve.1 Beyond the scientific question of how to limit carbon emissions and reduce polluting waste, it is also a moral question of who must lead this movement, who is most responsible for it, and who is likely to suffer the worst consequences. It is a problem encompassing complex international relations, nuanced differences in economic systems, and varying cultural lifestyles.2

India, in that context, presents an interesting paradox. Although it is a developing country with a fifth of its population (~about 270 million people) living in extreme poverty, it is already the world’s 3rd largest carbon emitter.3 The nation contributes to over 7 percent of global emissions, after China and the United States, both of which rank significantly above India on the United Nations Human Development Index chart.4,5

Figure 1: Carbon Emissions Split By Country

(Source: Union of Concerned Scientists)

Figure 2: Increase in Per Capita Power Consumption with Improvements in HDI

(Source: OurEnergyPolicy.Org)

A growing economy promises to a quarter of a billion people the status of the middle class, thereby creating energy demands leading to skyrocketing emissions.6 There is a moral equity case to be made for allowing India to achieve economic expansion through fossil fuel-driven growth similar to other developing nations as they enter the realm of prosperity.7 The planet, however, may not have enough time to recover if such a scenario is allowed to play out. Decarbonizing India’s power sector in that context holds a global significance in the fight against climate change8, given that electricity is the single most significant contributor to global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (electricity contributes to 66 percent of global emissions).9 It would seem unfair that the burden of saving the world’s climate has fallen on a nation failing to make ends meet for a significant portion of its population. However, India has not only lived up to these expectations but has also played a crucial part in a global fight against climate change.

Here is where India’s decarbonization efforts stand right now:

There’s more renewable energy in the Indian grid than one expects, with solar power outperforming other sectors.

Clean energy has always had a sense of Tomorrowism attached to it. Tomorrowism is a sort of skeptic optimism about an event that one believes is bound to happen, but will most likely occur glacially. In a survey of people quizzed for the due diligence of this article, 9 out of 10 individuals believed that there was less than 5 percent renewable energy in India’s power grid. However, the reality is brighter.

In 2010, India’s installed solar capacity was only 0.006 percent of its total generation capacity. Over the last ten years, solar’s installation has outpaced every single energy source in the Indian power grid, and solar alone now makes up 11 percent of the energy mix.

Figure 3: Increase in Share of Solar Energy Capacity in India (2010 – 2020)

(Source: Author’s Analysis, Power Ministry of India Data)

Solar energy sources, along with other clean sources like wind, biofuels, nuclear, hydro (large and small), and geothermal account for a sizable figure of 37 percent penetration of clean sources in the grid.10

Points scored

Figure 4: India’s Power Generation Capacity 2020

(Source: Author’s Analysis, Power Ministry of India Data)

Increasing clean energy sources has been successful due to several policy interventions.

In 2010, India launched the National Solar Mission with the sole aim of making India a global leader in solar energy. The mission set out an audacious target of a 2000X increase in solar energy over a period of 12 years, which would have totaled up to 20 Giga Watt (GW) by 2022. India is not a country famous for meeting its ambitious targets, but in this case, not only did India meet its targets, it did so a full four years ahead of schedule, in 2018.11

Several opportune market conditions supported this ambitious target:

  1. Cheap Labour
  2. Cheap Land
  3. Cheap Solar Modules

India had always had cheap land and labour but achieving cost-competitive solar panels required smart incentives, and a foreign policy that took advantage of China’s manufacturing prowess. China had figured out cheap solar modules in the early 2010s. Still, the west slapped anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese modules, hampering their growing production and further research and development (R&D), creating the perfect market conditions for chinese players to look to India as a growth market. This mix of cheap Indian land and labour, combined with cheap Chinese solar modules created the economic foundations required for a developing country to adopt renewable energy.12

As the Government of India’s 20 GW target seemed within reach, the government moved the goal post forward towards a more ambitious future – 175 GW clean energy by 2022 (Out of which 100 GW would be solar).13 The target was further moved up to a 500 GW target by 2030 (which would be roughly 50 percent of our total capacity) in June last year when there was a promising uptick in deployment.14 This progressive intent of government reflects the determination towards decarbonization, putting the clean energy requirement on an exponentially improving trajectory.

However, long term challenges remain with technology

Even though India’s grid could be 50 percent clean by 2030, the fact that the entire pie will grow (as a result of a growing economy) means the addition of  100 GW of fossil fuel-based generation.15 A net positive increase in the carbon emissions would do the planet no good even if it benefits India’s image in the global scenario. This raises the question of whether this net positive increase in carbon emissions could be eliminated by replacing all upcoming thermal plants through an even more aggressive clean energy policy.

The answer is again, wicked. Most clean energy sources are intermittent, which destabilize the grid because they fluctuate hourly, daily, and even seasonally. For, e.g., the entire output of a solar plant can fall from its capacity (say 100 MW) to zero if a sufficiently dense cloud passes over it – imagine what might happen during the monsoons if solar accounted for 30-40% of the national capacity. This is why thermal plants, technologically speaking, are still required: their ability to generate firm dispatchable power on demand, is a desirable characteristic for all generation sources.16

This is interesting, especially when looked at in the context of the demise of nuclear energy, which was once touted as the clean replacement for coal. Even though nuclear plants can produce zero-emission firm power and have gained scientific support for safety, they are still politically and culturally discarded as threats to humanity. A human tendency for negativity bias and lack of political efforts to reorient the societal view around nuclear energy is, therefore, likely to prevent the re-commercialization of the technology in the near future.17

One promising solution to intermittency is energy storage (like the lithium-ion batteries that Elon Musk’s Giga factories produce). However, most options are still nascent and costly. Signs are positive on the cost curve; yet, just last month, my team at ReNew Power won a government of India project where our hybrid (solar and wind) + battery storage power price (i.e., firm power) was cheaper than coal.18 With costs falling, energy storage is poised to play a considerable part in the future of the Indian grid, but India’s agility in being able to scale this technology still remains uncertain.19

India’s power policy needs restructuring

Power in India continues to be a state issue implying that regardless of the center’s sizeable clean energy targets, there is no binding mandate for states to execute them, which more often than not results in inconsistent policies that inhibit investment. Andhra Pradesh, for instance, canceled several PPA (Power Purchase Agreements) with clean energy projects in the state last year. This resulted in $40 Billion worth of investments put at risk because of a change in political administration in the state.20

Secondly, India’s distribution companies (DISCOMS) that buy electricity from power generating  enterprises in order to sell it to end consumers are in tremendous debt, about $740 Billion of it (~1/4th of National GDP).21 This has happened because DISCOMs are mandated to supply free electricity to the agriculture sector (size of the loss-making segment cannot be estimated because energy supplied is not metered). There is a hard cap on the price that DISCOMS are allowed to charge residential consumers. Further, power theft in India continues to be a pressing concern with complicated local transmission systems being highly susceptible to external breaches. While both agriculture and residential power policies remain valid instruments of state support for a poor population, there may be some value in thinking of alternatives to ensure financial sustainability.22

There is, however, a case for hope.

It is evident that there has been significant progress in decarbonizing the Indian power grid, and the government of India has shown serious intent in pursuing this goal with its considerable mandates. Still, several technological and policy challenges are likely to be major roadblocks in this project. Intermittency requires resolution, the energy storage industry needs promotion, nuclear energy needs rethinking as an option, and India’s power market requires restructuring for long term administrative and financial sustainability. The work ahead is immense, and it is easy to lose hope at the size of the challenge. Still, we must not forget that India has inertia and momentum on its side. In essence, India has already begun the decarbonization process, the market is sufficiently mature, most stakeholders across the chain are aligned on the goals, and the share of renewables in its grid is growing. This was no easy feat for a nation of India’s size, which quite rightly also had other pressing priorities but has, even then, chosen to participate and lead in this planetary battle. India will likely achieve its 2030 – 50 percent clean energy target. If trends are to be believed, it is also possible that an even more ambitious goal will supplant this goal as the tide continues to shift in favor of renewable sources. If the right factors work out at just the right time, India might perhaps become one of the first major economies to achieve a carbon-neutral grid, and only the fact that this possibility exists for a nation such as ours is a case enough for hope.

[1] Murtugudde, Raghu. “10 Reasons Why Climate Change Is a ‘Wicked’ Problem.” The Wire, December 11, 2019.

[2] Underdal, Arid. “Climate Change and International Relations (After Kyoto).” Annual Review of Political Science, May 2017.

[3] “India’s Poverty Profile,” World Bank (World Bank, May 27, 2016),

[4] “Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions.” Union of Concerned Scientists. Union of Concerned Scientists, October 10, 2019.

[5] “Human Development Reports.” | Human Development Reports. Accessed April 13, 2020.

[6] IEA (2019), World Energy Outlook 2019, IEA, Paris

[7] NJ Ayuk. “A Boycott of Fossil Fuel in Africa Would Be Misguided. Here’s Why.” World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum, January 19, 2019.

[8] Gulati, Kartik. “Why India and China’s Energy Strategy Holds the Key to Our Planet’s Future.” Medium. Medium, July 25, 2019.

[9] IEA (2019), World Energy Outlook 2019, IEA, Paris 

[10] “Policies and Publications.” Ministry of Power. Accessed April 13, 2020.

[11] TNN. “India Hits 20GW Solar Capacity Milestone.” The Economic Times. Economic Times, January 31, 2018.

[12] Pickerel, Kelly. “It’s Official: Chinese Solar Cells and Modules Hit with Additional 25% Tariff.” Solar Power World, August 8, 2018.

[13] A target of installing 175 GW of renewable energy capacity by the year 2022. MNRE, July 19, 2018.

[14] Varadhan, Sudarshan. “India Plans to Add 500 GW Renewable Energy by 2030: Government.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, June 25, 2019.

[15] Jaiswal, Anjali. “Transitioning India’s Economy to Clean Energy.” NRDC, November 6, 2019.

[16] Llana, Karen. “Renewable Energy Intermittency: Realistic Solutions for Asia.” Pöyry global, December 18, 2018.

[17] Shellenberger, Michael. “If Nuclear Power Is So Safe, Why Are We So Afraid Of It?” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, September 6, 2018.

[18] Parikh, Anjana. “Greenko, ReNew Win SECI’s 1.2 GW Solar, Wind Auction with Storage for Peak Power Supply.” Mercom India, February 9, 2020.

[19] Llana, Karen. “Renewable Energy Intermittency: Realistic Solutions for Asia.” Pöyry global, December 18, 2018.

[20] Shah, Kashish. “$40 Billion of Renewable Energy Investments at Risk in Andhra – Opinion by Kashish Shah: ET EnergyWorld.” ETEnergyworld, August 7, 2019.

[21] Silver, Caleb. “The Top 20 Economies in the World.” Investopedia. Investopedia, April 17, 2020.

[22] Thomas, Tanya. “Discom Debt to Swing Back to Pre-UDAY Level of ₹2.6 Lakh Crore in FY20: Crisil.” Livemint. Livemint, May 6, 2019.

Download White Paper

1 Comment
Newest Most Voted
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments
Abhishek Dasmunshy
Abhishek Dasmunshy
2 years ago

I believe the goal isn’t merely revolving around achieving the ambitious target but is to take up the MakeInIndia challenge more seriously, especially given the current scenario. Chinese are still using the dumping strategy as far as India is concerned. We need to build a market for ourselves in the way China did in order to get a better financial hand.

Related Articles

Conflict over scarce natural resources has been documented as an important source of armed struggle1. Billon2states, “the idea that wars are associated with resources is probably as old as war itself”. Climate change and the associated reduction in freshwater availability, worsening soil productivity, increase in weather volatility and heightened atmospheric warming are expected to aggravate the resource degradation that is already  underway3. The agricultural sector is likely to be extremely vulnerable to these changes through the impacts on agricultural yields, crop quality, and thereby, farm incomes4. However, the impact of climate change on productivity is not isolated to the agricultural sector. Recent literature also indicates a significant impact of (largely) temperature on productivity in the manufacturing sector too5,6. We focus on agriculture because in the  Indian context, agriculture and allied sectors (such as plantation, forestry, fishing, hunting etc.) alone employ nearly 58% of the workforce7. There is now a large literature in economics that examines how climate change induces violent conflict as well as protests by exacerbating competition over  scarce natural resources which affects economic growth, livelihoods, commodity prices, and political stability,8,9,10,11,12,13. Given the importance of the agricultural sector in India, this presents a serious governance challenge.   

In this article, we present a brief summary of the occurrences of environment and agriculture related conflicts in India using the Armed Conflict  Location and Event Data (ACLED). The ACLED is a rich source of information on different types of conflicts including protest events for many  countries around the world. It collects information on different types of events which include violent and non-violent conflicts, and peaceful protests  on issues as diverse as strategic developments, territorial conflicts, state-based violence, attacks on civilians, religious and ethnic/caste-based conflicts  as well as events which are centred around the issues of environment and agriculture. Of course, several event categories have significant overlap in  terms of the reasons for such conflict. A detailed event description is provided corresponding to each event along with the geographical location and  timing. For India, ACLED has recorded over 57000 events spanning across 592 districts starting from 2016 with weekly updates. We focus on the  time period from 2016-2019 and analyse the event descriptions of each observation to create a subset of events that are induced by environment or  agriculture related causes.  

According to our analysis, environmental conflict events in India can broadly be attributed to causes concerning environmental pollution and  degradation, extreme weather, use of common property resources such as land and water bodies, wildlife encroachment as well as issues related to  sanitation and disease. Of these, events concerning the use of water bodies such as rivers for irrigation and impacts of extreme weather events on  crop loss are directly related to agriculture. We further observe that all agricultural conflict events are closely linked to agricultural risks and the economic system’s ability to mitigate them. Agricultural risks result in uncertainty in farm incomes arising due to production risks (i.e., the low yields due to weather events, pest infestations etc.) and price risks (i.e., low prices due to uncertainty in the input and output markets). Conflicts (including  protests and demonstrations) concerning agricultural issues are largely on account of the demand for functional risk management tools by farmers  which include: 

1. Demand for subsidized institutional credit delivery and farm loan waivers to stabilize income in case of output and/or price shocks. 

2. Demand for timely release of crop insurance payments in case of low yields due to weather variations, pest infestation, animal attacks, etc. 

3. Demand for remunerative prices (mostly MSP) to provide protection from crop price volatility.  

4. Demand for water release from dams and rivers for irrigation in an effort to reduce dependence on rainfall and minimize the output risks due  to rainfall vagaries. 

Environmental/Agricultural Conflict Trends: 

Expectedly, over time we see a sharp rise in the absolute frequency of both environmental and agricultural conflict events in India. However, the  percentage of environmental and agricultural conflict events as a proportion of total conflict events, has consistently been ~12% and ~9%  respectively. On the other hand, the proportion of agricultural conflict events as a fraction of total environmental conflict events rose from ~42% in  2016 to ~47% in 2019. This is indicative of the increasing relative importance of agricultural conflict events within the larger set of environmental  conflict events. 

Figure 1: Data Source: ACLED 

Agriculture Related Conflict Events & Policy Tools for Risk Management:  

There are three main policy tools for farm-level risk mitigation in India: credit, insurance and minimum support price (MSP). While credit and  insurance aid in consumption smoothing in case of crop loss, MSP serves to stabilize income in case of a fall in prices. Credit can aid farm-level risk  management in two stages. Ex-ante, in case of no shock, it can facilitate: (a) adoption of climate resilient inputs and techniques (for e.g., purchase of  power and water for irrigation to reduce dependence on rainfall, purchase of seeds of more climate resilient crops etc.), and (b) increase in farm mechanization to reduce output risks. Ex-post, in case of a shock, credit and, importantly, insurance can fulfil immediate cash needs for input  stabilization and consumption smoothing14. However, historically, access to these risk mitigation tools is highly skewed in favour of richer, wealthier,  more educated farmers belonging to forward castes,15,16,17,18,19,20. This access inequality is a major cause for agriculture related conflict.   

We observe a positive correlation between the demand for agricultural risk management and agricultural conflict events, i.e., areas which are more  risk-prone and therefore have a greater demand for agricultural risk management, also have higher incidence of agriculture related conflicts. On  average, states with higher credit disbursal per agricultural household also have a higher proportion of agricultural conflicts by ~2.7 percent (Figure 2). Similarly, on average, states with higher insurance amounts disbursed per covered agricultural household, have a higher relative incidence of agriculture  related conflicts by ~5.7 percent (Figure 3).

Figure 2: Data Source: Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare (MoAFW), Government of India and ACLED 
Figure 3: Data Source: MoAFW, Government of India and ACLED 

These findings reflect the critical role that agricultural risks play in agricultural conflict incidence. As the frequency and extremity of adverse weather  events such as droughts and floods are likely to increase substantially due to climate change, it is important to develop effective and affordable risk  management tools which are also accessible to all sections of the farming community. In the absence of accessible climate adaptation strategies which  include (but are not limited to) efficient functioning of the system of farm credit and agricultural insurance; not only do we stand the risk of crop loss  and income loss for the farming community, but also the heightened risk of conflicts stemming from loss of livelihoods for farmers and declining  food security. 


StatePercentage of Agricultural Conflict EventsAgricultural Credit Disbursed (in INR crore)Number of Operational Holdings (OH) (in ‘000)Credit Disbursed/OH (in ‘000)Credit Disbursal Category (High/Low)*Insurance Claims (INR)Number of FarmersInsurance Amount Paid/Farmer InsuredInsurance Claims Categories (High/Low)**
Andhra Pradesh 5.19 92868.62 8524 108.95 High 9437700000 1778000 5308.04 High
Gujarat 8.63 54276.7 5321 102.00 High 12672200000 1980000 6400.10 High
Haryana 8.71 49481.07 1628 303.94 High 2969000000 1336000 2222.31 High
Karnataka 12.31 78082.72 8681 89.95 High 20668200000 2947000 7013.30 High
Kerala 2.69 67738.76 7583 89.33 High 437300000 77000 5679.22 High
Rajasthan 11.50 74303.86 7655 97.07 High 19173700000 9355000 2049.57 High
Tamil Nadu 7.76 132144.57 7938 166.47 High 36386600000 1463000 24871.22 High
Himachal Pradesh 5.38 6116.15 997 61.35 High 451800000 380000 1188.95 Low
Uttarakhand 1.62 6505.43 881 73.84 High 274700000 261000 1052.49 Low
Madhya Pradesh 12.47 56149.06 10003 56.13 Low 20438800000 7461000 2739.42 High
Odisha 7.46 21264.96 4866 43.70 Low 4327400000 1820000 2377.69 High
Bihar 1.52 26184.58 16413 15.95 Low 3478500000 2714000 1281.69 Low
Chhattisgarh 2.10 12237.42 4011 30.51 Low 1599700000 1549000 1032.73 Low
Jharkhand 0.97 4379.99 2803 15.63 Low 310900000 879000 353.70 Low
Maharashtra 7.75 81383.84 15285 53.24 Low 23187800000 11884000 1951.18 Low
Tripura 0.97 1513.13 573 26.41 Low 7100000 12000 591.67 Low
Uttar Pradesh 4.22 81584.01 23822 34.25 Low 5745800000 7289000 788.28 Low
West Bengal 0.41 34895.72 7243 48.18 Low 4216900000 4133000 1020.30 Low
*: Credit Disbursal/ Agricultural HH > Median implies Category = HIGH | Credit Disbursal/ Agricultural HH < Median implies Category = LOW **: Insurance Amount Paid/Covered HH > Median implies Category = HIGH | Insurance Amount Paid/Covered HH < Median implies Category  = LOW

The views expressed in the post are those of the author and in no way reflect those of the ISPP Policy Review or the Indian School of Public Policy. Images via open source.


[1]: Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 1998. ” Armed Conflict and The Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3  381- 400. 

[2]: Billon, Philippe Le. 2012. “Digging into “Resource War” Beliefs.” Human Geography, Vol. 5, No. 2 1-14. 

[3]: Raleigh, Clionadh, and Henrik Urdal. 2007. “Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict.” Political Geography, Vol. 26 674- 694. 

[4]: Altieri, Miguel A., and Clara I. Nicholls. 2017. “The adaptation and mitigation potential of traditional agriculture in a changing climate.” Climatic  Change, Vol. 40 33-45. 

[5]: Adhvaryu, Achutya, Namrata Kala, and Anant Nyshadham. 2020. “The Light and the Heat: Productivity Co-Benefits of Energy-Saving  Technology”. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 102, Issue 4 779-792. 

[6]: Somanathan, E., Rohini Somanathan, Anant Sudharshan, and Meenu Tewari. ” The Impact of Temperature on Productivity and Labor Supply:  Evidence from Indian Manufacturing”. Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming. 

[7]: National Statistical Office. 2020. Periodic Labour Force Survey (July 2018 – June 2019). New Delhi: Ministry of Statistics and Programme  Implementation.;

[8]: Dell, Melissa, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2012. “Temperature Shocks and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Half  Century”. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 3, 66-95. 

[9]: Hsiang, Solomon M., Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel. 2013. “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict”. Science, Vol. 341,  Issue 6151, 1235367. 

[10]: Dell, Melissa, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2014. “What Do We Learn from the Weather? The New Climate-Economy  Literature”. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 52, No. 3, 740-798. 

[11]: Maystadt, Jean-Francois, and Olivier Ecker. 2014. “Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock  Price Shocks?”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 96, Issue 4 1157-1182. 

[12]: Harari, Mariaflavia, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2018. “Conflict, Climate and Cells: a Disaggregated Analysis”. Review of Economics and Statistics,  Vol. 100, Issue 4 594-608.

[13]: McGuirk, Eoin, F., and Nathan Nunn. 2021. “Transhumant Pastoralism, Climate Change and Conflict in Africa”. Working Paper, Harvard  University. 

[14]: Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2008. Managing Risk in Farming. (Farm Extension Guide, Volume 3), Rome, 2008: FAO 

[15]: Kumar, Anjani, Dhiraj K. Singh, and Prabhat Kumar. 2007. “Performance of Rural Credit and Factors Affecting the Choice of Credit Sources.”  Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, No. 3 297-313. 

[16]: Kumar, Anjani, K. M. Singh, and Shradhajali Sinha. 2010. “Institutional Credit to Agriculture Sector in India: Status, Performance and  Determinants.” Agricultural Economics Research Review, Vol. 23, July-December 253-264. 

[17]: Kumar, Anjani, R.K.P Singh, Shiv Jee, Subhash Chand, Gaurav Tripathi, and Sunil Saroj. 2015. “Dynamics of Access to Rural Credit in India:  Patterns and Determinants.” Agricultural Economics Research Review, Vol 28 151-166. 

[18]: Shukla, Sumedha, and Gaurav Arora. 2020. “No hand to lend.” Down To Earth, September 16th-30th: 50-54. 

[19]: NABARD. 2018. NABARD All India Rural Financial Inclusion Survey 2016-17. New Delhi: National Bank for Agricultural and Rural  Development (NABARD).

[20]: Kumar, Sunil Mitra. 2013. “Does Access to Formal Agricultural Credit Depend on Caste?” World Development, Vol. 43, No. 3 315-328.

Data Sources: 

[21]: Agricultural Census Division. 2016. Agriculture Census (2015-16). Census, New Delhi: Department of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare,  Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare, Government of India. 

[22]: Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare. 2017. Pocket Book of Agricultural Statistics. Statistical  Handbook, New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare, Government of India.

[23]: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare. 2016. PMFBY State Wise Business Statistics . Accessed April 4th, 2021.

The wide-ranging vulnerability induced by the current pandemic has heightened global interest in shock-responsive social protection (SRSP), i.e. adapting social protection (SP) for addressing the impacts of large-scale natural disasters, economic shocks, pandemics and political crises. Figure 1 shows the common SRSP strategies which policymakers can consider for addressing covariate shocks. 

Figure 1. Adapting social protection systems for crises

Until recently, India’s SP system was largely limited to the formal sector. While there is still a considerable degree of fragmentation and multiple federal schemes operate in silos, there is a growing policy recognition for consolidation and convergence backed by integrated systems.1 The last 15 years witnessed a growth in rights-based entitlements and systemic reforms to build a more inclusive system.2 These encompass the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) program, Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), Public Distribution System (PDS), National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) and National Social Assistance Program (NSAP). These programs show a greater degree of institutionalization in terms of legal and/or policy backing, benefit design and implementation processes, resulting in improved coverage. 

The COVID-19 crisis has seen unique innovations involving piggybacking on India’s most extensive safety net, the PDS, for shock response, reiterating its relevance for SRSP. For instance, the Government of Bihar piggybacked on the PDS (although with challenges and swift course corrections)3 to provide a one-off transfer of Rs.1000 to ration-card holders during the COVID-19 crisis. This experience needs to be systematically documented, as it will play a crucial role in informing future preparedness actions. Similarly, Uttar Pradesh (UP)4 and Odisha5 piggybacked on the extensive network of fair price shops (FPS) to distribute food grains (in lieu of in-school cooked meals) to beneficiaries of MDM, while Delhi6 and Kerala7 used it to distribute ‘essential item kits’. Leveraging existing delivery systems helped save crucial time and reduce errors in distribution.

PDS also demonstrated flexibility by expanding vertically (topping up entitlements) and horizontally (increasing coverage). Entitlements for over 80 crore ration-card holders were doubled8 and eligibility was relaxed to include non-ration card holders 9 such as migrant workers10 and some families who are above the poverty line11. On March 26th, the government announced the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY) for the period of April to June, further extended till November 2020, for providing free ration (5 kg of rice/wheat and 1 kg of pulses), in addition to the pre-existing entitlements of PDS beneficiaries12. Several states announced their own relief packages, which supplemented this quantity of ration and/or expanded the basket of items. 13,14 Under the Atma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan, free rations were extended to migrants from May till August. The pandemic and the consequent exodus of migrants also hastened the speed of ensuring inter-state portability of ration cards through the ‘One Nation-One Ration Card’ (ONORC) approach, though challenges persist. 

Although the PDS played a critical role in alleviating the vulnerability induced by the pandemic, several inadequacies of the system were exposed as well. The challenges posed by the PDS need to be addressed in order to respond better to future crises. The most fundamental criticism of the current PDS regime is the exclusion of eligible beneficiaries. This exclusion is layered and hierarchical, shown in Figure 2. The use of outdated 2011 population census figures to determine the extent of the coverage of the scheme has excluded more than 100 million people from the system.15 The second layer of exclusion emanates from the mandate of linking Aadhaar with ration cards.16 Both these shortcomings represent the plight of vulnerable non-ration card holders who suffer disproportionately because of the difficulty in identifying them for delivering immediate relief. As the ONORC does not address the previous two layers of exclusion, it is plagued by their associated drawbacks too. 

Figure 2. The PDS Exclusion Hierarchy: Introducing ONORC without accompanying measures for addressing the deeper issues of large-scale exclusion is merely touching the tip of the iceberg 

Another welfare program that can learn from the PDS and respond better to future shocks is NREGS, which came to the rescue of many distressed workers in the wake of the widespread job losses induced by the current pandemic. 17  While this surge in demand resulted in significant expansion of the program, spatial mapping of the newly issued job cards across rural districts with their population shares of outmigration and poverty revealed substantial unmet demand. 18 At the same time, the lack of a national urban employment guarantee (UEG) scheme left the urban poor unprotec#srsp18ted. The long overdue UEG is finally under consideration19, and its timely implementation will bring urban informal workers within the ambit of wider crisis management. However, the success of both NREGS and UEG depends on the ability of the states to generate sufficient employment opportunities corresponding to the surging demand. Mobilizing local authorities for identifying such opportunities is a prerequisite to yield tangible results, especially during crises. Another important issue is that of inadequate compensation. NREGS wages are lower than the minimum wage for agriculture in many states.20 Times of crisis unquestionably demand a top-up over the guaranteed wage. The recent guidelines on streamlining NREGS wage payments21 is a welcome move, however, the government must still consider switching to cash payment during difficult times at least in remote areas. NREGS therefore presents a case for both horizontal and vertical expansion.

In conclusion, the detrimental consequences of delayed SP response22 witnessed during the current pandemic only strengthens the case for instituting an emergency response framework across these schemes to fast-track assistance deployment when it is needed the most. The starting point for making SP shock-responsive is to map existing SP systems in terms of their coverage, adequacy and comprehensiveness: to understand the reach of routine SP systems, their capacity to deliver relief adequately and the range of risks covered. An efficient way to do this is to transition from multiple independent program databases to an Integrated Social Protection Information System. Additionally, the shortcomings of existing systems that hinder effective coverage during crises demonstrate that successful adaptation of such systems for emergency response requires them to be resilient in the first place. Given that the case for short-term universalization of SP during a crisis rests on fiscal considerations and political will, ensuring minimum exclusion errors in identifying beneficiaries becomes the most effective strategy for increasing the resilience of existing SP systems and improving the coverage of SRSP systems. Flexible delivery mechanisms form yet another critical element of a resilient SP system. 

Adapting SP for accommodating the expanded pool of vulnerable population prompts the need for a National Social Registry backed by comprehensive and dynamic socio-economic data in order to cater to those outside the purview of routine SP (urban poor, migrants). Moreover, vulnerability and needs assessments23 can be leveraged to prioritise regions and households for better risk preparedness and response24. Expanding routine coverage in areas frequently affected by shocks along with appropriate monitoring and evaluation can serve as ideal pilot studies for iterative, evidence-based design tweaks. 

SRSP contingency framework must also be incorporated within the ambit of the formal policy, so that readily deployable Standard Operating Procedures are in place in times of need25. This includes an assessment of the fiscal space for shock response in terms of assessing alternative sources and channels of contingency financing26. A final ingredient of successful SRSP systems relates to a context driven approach. Decentralized decision-making enables policy response to be based on local context, which is extremely relevant for crisis management. Hence, states and their local governments need to be empowered, especially financially, and be involved in formulating SRSP as they know the ground realities and local vulnerabilities most thoroughly. 

The current context of COVID-19 has and will throw up many challenges, particularly by amplifying already existing inequalities. In these times, developing strong SRSP systems is paramount to mitigate such adverse impacts. 


1. The World Bank. (2019, February 20). Schemes to Systems: The Future of Social Protection in India.

2. Dreze, J. & Khera, R. (2017). Recent Social Security Initiatives in India. World Development, 98, 555-572.

3. Government of Bihar. (2020, May 8). Directions regarding monitoring of cash transfer Rs 1000 distribution under PDS ration card linking related issues. 

4. Bajpai, N. (2020, May 30). UP govt to disburse ration, food security allowance to school children.The New Indian Express.

5. Orissa Post. (2020, March 21). Odisha govt to provide MDM to students through PDS.

6. The Hindu. (2020, June 4). Not discriminating between ration and non-ration cardholders, govt. tells HC.

7. Joseph, A. T. (2020, April 6). How Kerala is feeding its 3.48 crore residents, migrants amid the COVID-19 lockdown. The Caravan.

8. Government of India. (2020, March 20). DO Letter F. No. l-212020 Desk (MDM).

9. Government of India. (2020, March 30). PRADHAN MANTRI GARIB KALVAN ANNA YOJANA – Additional allocation of foodgrains to all the beneficiaries covered under Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) free of cost for a period of three months.

10. Government of India. (2020, May 15). Allocation of foodgrain to the migrants @ 5 kg per person per month for two months free of cost as part of Economic measures (Atma Nirbhar Bharat).

11. ANI. (2020, April 9). Gujarat to provide free ration to 60 lakh families amid COVID-19 lockdown. Business Standard. 

12. Ministry of Finance. (2020, March 26). Finance Minister announces Rs 1.70 Lakh Crore relief package under Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana for the poor to help them fight the battle against Corona Virus.

13. Telangana Today. (2020, March 22). Telangana Lockdown: 12 kg free rice per person, Rs 1,500 per family to be supplied for each white ration card.

14. Angad, A. (2020, May 15). Non-PDS card holders to foodgrains: Jharkhand fears problems in migrant aid. The Indian Express.

15. IndiaSpend. (2020, April 16). More than 100mn excluded from PDS as govt uses outdated Census 2011 data.


17. Bhalotia, S., Dhingra, S. & Kondirolli, F. (2020). City of Dreams no More: The Impact of Covid-19 on Urban Workers in India. Centre for Economic Performance, Paper No. 008.

18. Narayan, S., Oldiges, C. & Saha, S. (2020, December 1). Does workfare work? MNREGA during Covid-19. Ideas for India.

19. Bloomberg. (2020, September 12). India plans to extend rural jobs guarantee scheme to cities, to address urban unemployment. Financial Express.

20. Aggarwal, A. & Paikra, V. (2020, October 5). Why are MNREGA wages so low? Ideas for India.

21. Department of Rural Development & National Informatics Centre. (2019, December). Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Streamlining MGNREGA Wage Payments.

22. Ghosh, J. (2020). A critique of the Indian government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, 47, 519–530.

23. O’Brien, C., Holmes R. and Scott, Z., with Barca, V. (2018) ‘Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit—Appraising the use of social protection in addressing largescale shocks’, Oxford Policy Management, Oxford, UK. 

24. Acharya, R. & Porwal, A. (2020). A vulnerability index for the management of and response to the COVID-19 epidemic in India: an ecological study. The Lancet Global Health, 8(9), 1142-1151. 

25. UNICEF. (2019, December). Programme Guidance: Strengthening Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems. 

26. O’Brien, C., Holmes R. and Scott, Z., with Barca, V. (2018) ‘Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit—Appraising the use of social protection in addressing largescale shocks’, Oxford Policy Management, Oxford, UK. 

The views expressed in the post are those of the author and in no way reflect those of the ISPP Policy Review or the Indian School of Public Policy. Images via open source.

Editor: Samir Pius George
February 1, 2021


The power sector consists of five stakeholders- energy sources, power generators, transmitters, distributors, and consumers (figure 1). The draft National Electricity Plan 2016 projects that the peak demand at the end of 2021-22 would be 235 GW.1 As per the 2019 CRISIL report, India’s installed capacity of power generation is 344 GW. Produced electricity could only be transported to the region of demand if the transmission network is capable. The current transmission line capacity in India is 3.9 Lac km. It grew at a compound annual growth rate of 7.2% from 2012 to 2018.

Figure 1. Present structure of power sector, Source: “Overview of the power sector,” PRS report

The power generation capacity is sufficient, and the transmission capacity is rapidly growing, but the power distribution is the weakest link in the value chain. Since 1991, the power sector has seen several reforms to improve the status quo, but they failed to address the issue of the DISCOMs being in perpetual losses. The fundamental issue is that DISCOMs fund their operational losses by debt. As of March 2015, the state DISCOMs had accumulated outstanding debt of approximately ₹4.3 lakh crore and roughly ₹3.8 lakh crore losses.2 The government launched UDAY (Ujjwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana) to allow the states to help DISCOMs overcome these losses. The scheme helped the DISCOMs clear their books, but it did not resolve the loss accumulation’s fundamental issue. DISCOMs are in losses because of a substantial mismatch between fixed cost and the recovered fixed charges. The mismatch reflects due to the electricity consumption subsidy and the Aggregate Technical and Commercial (AT&C) losses. Electricity consumption subsidy is the largest share (49%) in India’s pie of total energy subsidies. In the financial year 2017-18, the total electricity consumption subsidy was ₹86400 crores.3

Table 1  Increase in main “direct” subsidies

The government subsidizes electricity for some consumers, such as metro rails, railways, and agriculture consumers. DISCOMs provide subsidized electricity to these consumers and get compensated by the government later. However, governments tend to delay payments, which creates a non-recovery of the fixed utility costs.

The central and state regulators (CERC and SERC) and the DISCOMs recover these ‘losses due to subsidies’ by cross-subsidizing the low-tariff users by increasing the variable charge of the high-tariff users. This practice increases the cost of electricity.

What is the fixed and variable charge?

The supply tariff (payable by the consumer) is divided into two categories: fixed charge and the variable charge. When the consumer books a connection, the DISCOM sanctions a specific load to that consumer. The fixed charge corresponds to that sanctioned load. Variable charge corresponds to the actual consumption of the consumer.

The fixed charge includes capacity charges payable to power generators, transmission charges, operation and maintenance expenses, depreciation, interest on loans, and equity return. The variable charge recovers the variable utility costs, such as the variable cost component of power purchase.

Looking at the power sector from the first principles

According to Shah and Kelkar, the state is an inefficient institution. They establish the fact by giving a law of unintended consequence, which causes the state inefficiency- “A government intervention that carries an intention to have a certain outcome will very often end up yielding a very different result.”4 Market freedom works well in producing goods and services efficiently. The state should intervene where the market fails to provide efficiency. The market fails when there is information asymmetry between the producer and the buyer, a monopoly in the market, any externality (non-negotiated outcomes) involved, or in the case of public good.5

An individual can be prohibited from consuming electricity (excludable), and its consumption by an individual affects the overall supply (rival). Since the production, transmission, and distribution of electricity are excludable and rival, therefore principally it should be produced, transmitted, and distributed by the market, i.e., the private players. There is no state intervention required until a market failure could be quantified in terms of externality (positive and negative), market monopoly by a private player, information asymmetry, and public good.

With the electricity act of 2003, the government tried to create a free market in the power sector. The intention was to harness market efficiency in the sector by inviting private players to create competition, negotiation, and choice. As per the power sector’s status quo, the government-owned utilities generate 54% of the total power. 92% of the transmission utilities are government-owned, and the government owns almost all the DISCOMs (distribution companies) except in Delhi, Mumbai, and in a few other cities.5 Hence the government did not succeed in their original intention.

For a free market to function, price control by the government distorts the supply and demand equilibrium as it creates a deadweight loss6 to the economy. A free market does not keep entry barriers, and the market mechanism decides the profit margins.

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) regulates the tariffs of DISCOMs heavily. As per section 79 and section 86 of the electricity act 2003, CERC and SERC control the tariffs of the generation, transmission, and distribution companies and issue licenses for the market entry, fix trading margins, and specify the grid technology, and adjudicate upon the disputes.7

The case of state intervention in the power sector

Let us consider that there is no state. The market will have the responsibility to produce, transmit, and distribute the electricity. The state will then intervene through either financing or regulating the market. It should not produce because, in this sector, there is no public good. There are four possible market failures

1. Negative Externality: 64% of the electricity production in India is by coal-based thermal power plants (Source: Ministry of Power; PRS). The production of electricity by coal-based thermal power plants requires coal burning, which pollutes the air. Air pollution is a negative externality because there is a channel of influence between the polluter and the citizens that are not negotiated.

Since it is a market failure, the state should intervene. There are two modes of intervention that seems possible in this case:

a. Regulation and Tax mechanism: States can regulate the thermal power plants by putting stringent emission norms and imposing taxes on the plants’ amount of pollution. The tax may act as a disincentive to the polluters, and they will pollute less.

b. Create a pollution market: The state can limit the aggregate pollution that all the thermal plants can cumulatively make and make the emission tradable.

To understand the two interventions and their efficiency, let us create an oversimplified hypothetical scenario to understand the market mechanism. There are two power plants X and Y, with a production capacity of 2GW per year. Plant X pollutes 4 million tonnes of CO2 for the 2GW production, and plant Y pollutes 5.33 million tonnes of CO2 for the same production. A plant can earn $100 per GW per year. To safeguard the broader public health and reduce the pollution levels, the state put a ceiling on the amount of CO2 that a power plant can emit. As per the norms, a plant with a 2GW capacity can pollute up to 3 million tonnes per year. Under this regulation, the total power generation in the society would be 2.62GW (X=1.5GW and Y=1.12GW), assuming the proportional relation between emission and power produced. If the cost of pollution to society is $30 per million tonnes, then the overall capital generation would be $82 (X: $150-$90 and Y: $112-$90). The $30 will be charged from the power plants as the carbon tax.

Bringing the market mechanism (Concept of carbon trading): In our oversimplified hypothetical scenario, let us bring the market mechanism and analyze the results. Instead of a simple regulation-tax mechanism, the state decides to sell the total emission quota. The cost of 1 million tonnes is $30. Plant X a and Y bought their quota of 3 million tonnes each for $90. Plant Y knows that plant X has a capacity of 2GW. Hence it is in its interest to sell the quota of 1 million tonnes to plant X. After the trade, plant X will operate at its full capacity and over-pollute, whereas plant Y will under-pollute. The overall pollution will remain at 6 million tonnes. However, the overall capita generation in society would be $95 with the production of 2.75GW.

Tax collection is a costly affair. Tax collection is costly, therefore spending one rupee of the tax money is equivalent to spending three rupees.8 Even if $30 is charged as tax from each plant in the first method, the net value of the tax collected would be one-third of the total, i.e., $10 only.  In the method of carbon trading, this inefficiency is also removed.

2. Positive Externality: When the supply and demand are met, the market reaches an equilibrium price. However, there will still be a marginalized population left that will not be able to afford the electricity at the equilibrium price. Hence either there is less consumption or no consumption. The electricity consumption is directly proportional to the GDP. Access to power increases the overall production, nudges small scale manufacturers to enter the market, boosts the retail market of electrical appliances, and increases the standard of living. Hence there is a case of a positive externality.

Currently, the government provides subsidy and regulates supply tariff structure. This subsidy and regulation model creates complexity in tariff structures that lead to information asymmetry and decreases the overall efficiency of benefits.  Instead, it should use the method of direct benefit transfers to promote consumption. It is a low cost and a less intrusive method.

3. Information Asymmetry: In a free market, the power demand fluctuates frequently. The demand fluctuation depends on various factors like peak hours and seasons. Depending upon the fluctuating demand, market prices could vary. If there is a lack of transparency in these fluctuating prices, the DISCOMs may hide the information and overcharge the consumer. Without information about the price fluctuation in the public domain, the consumer will not know if the DISCOMs are overcharging it.

The government should intervene and monitor the market and make the information available in the public domain so that the consumer could decide to continue with the present service provider or move to another service provider.

4. Monopoly: The distribution business is the combination of content (electricity) and carriage (wires). A distribution company owns the wires in an area and supplies electricity purchased from the producer and drawn from the transmission. Such ownership of wires makes the DISCOM a monopoly in that area. As per the Electricity Act 2003, the consumer can choose a different DISCOM for the electricity supply. If the current DISCOM owns the wires, it will always overcharge the other DISCOM for using the wires. This capability-to-overcharge will give an edge to the wire owner to interfere in the pricing of its competitors. This edge will make the current service provider a monopoly. DISCOMs also tend to pose operational barriers and procedural delays/rejections when switching to other providers on unreasonable grounds.

A study commissioned by the Forum of Regulators in 2015 suggested the separation of content and carriage (C&C). Such separation will make the carriage a separate entity that can provide services to any DISCOM. The wire company will not get involved in the content business. This separation will rule out any possibility of a monopoly creation.

Stakeholders respond to the incentives in a free market. Individuals running the state-owned utilities behave in their best interest. The incentive for a government employee, in this case, is not to optimize the process to compete in the market as there is less and unfair competition. Moreover, substantial political intervention weakens the market further.

In a free market of private players, the incentive structure changes, and it brings competition and efficiency in the market. Below is the predicted incentive structure in the power market that is free and has minimum state intervention.

StakeholdersIncentiveExpected action in a competitive market
ProducerProduce up to its optimal capacity to maximize their profits.Maintain the demand by keeping the prices low and increase efficiency to compete in the market.
TransmissionWin more transmission contracts to survive the market.Keep transmission losses low and maintain the high capacity to maintain low transmission cost.
DISCOMMaximize the consumption of consumers and win more customersReduce outage by investing in technology like smart metering to monitor real-time consumption data. Minimize the tariffs to increase demand and consumption.

Figure 2 Incentive structure of the stakeholder in a free market (author’s analysis)

Atma-Nirbhar Package

Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the Atma Nirbhar package on May 12. It was indicated that this special economic package would be worth 20 lakh crores, which is approximately equal to 10% of the country’s GDP. The Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, in her subsequent conferences, unfolded the specifics of the interventions that the government is planning out of the relief package.

In the power sector, DISCOMs were given special attention, and the following interventions were announced:

1. Intervention: At present, the consumer bears the cost of the inefficiencies in various processes by the DISCOMS. However, as per the announcements, the DISCOMS would have to bear the cost of their inefficiencies. The government may come up with some penalty system for the DISCOMS for the inefficiencies such as load-shedding.8

This could prove as a needed intervention in the market. This is because due to these regulations, the DISCOMS would be disincentivized to use inefficient ways of distributions.

2. Intervention: The government has planned to remove the regulatory asset funds that were provided to the distribution companies.

3. Intervention: It is planned that the distribution companies would be provided the monetary support (liquid) of approximately 90,000 crores. This extra support is given so that the distribution companies could be relieved from the power GENCOS’s liabilities.

This could be a short-term plan but would remain ineffective. Earlier, the government has tried many times to de-burden the DISCOMs but failed in the longer run. This is because we need to develop more freedom in the sector and inscribe it in the Electricity Act 2003.

4. Intervention: The government has decided to privatize the distribution companies in the union territories.

This intervention is needed but not sufficient. Privatization brings market freedom. Even the Electricity Act of 2003 proposes an open market competition. Still, we see that the market mechanism is not functioning as per its full potential. Removing the government’s market monopoly in the market economy is essential, but still, there is a chance of the creation of other kinds of monopolies due to the non-separation of carriers and content. Hence there could be two ways forward:

a. The carrier and content entities should be distinct and different in the power distribution market.

b. The privatization of DISCOMs must be done in all states.


Electricity to the country is like blood to the body. The more efficiently it circulates, more will be the growth of the economy. Unfortunately, the circulation system of electricity is cluttered. India claims to have achieved 100%9 electrification that provides the necessary infrastructure for electricity reach in the country’s remotest part. With the installed capacity of 324GW and demand of the only 270GW, India sits on a surplus production capacity of 54GW per year.

Nevertheless, we have power outages, and DISCOMs are in loss. 17 years ago, the country opened her market for competition, but still, we have a government monopoly in production, transmission, and distribution of the power sector. With the non-alignment of incentives and open yet restricted private players’ entry, the current power structure will continue to disappoint. Even after 73 years of independence and 17 years of significant policy reforms in the sector, many see electricity as a rare and expensive commodity.

The power sector is like a broken machine, and the reforms are acting like a repair or replacement of a broken part. We need to change the entire machine. John Maynard Keynes said that “The important thing for government is not to things which individuals are doing already, and do them a little better or a little worse, but to those things which at present are not done at all.” State intervention is justified only in the zone of market failures. The state should not get involved in either production, transmission, or distribution of power. The first policy problem is to establish a system where the market can work with freedom. The second policy problem would be market failures. The state has a huge role to play in the market failures in the power sector. It must remove the externalities by regulating the market and giving the freedom for carbon trading to prosper. Removing information asymmetry and breaking monopolies will increase efficiency and produce more utility for society.


  1. CRISIL Infrastructure Advisory. (2019). Diagnostic study of the power distribution sector. Niti Aayog, Government of India.
  2. UDAY (Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana). (2015, November 5). Financial Turnaround of Power Distribution Companies. Press Information Bureau, Government of India.
  3. Soman, A. (2018). India’s Energy Transition: Subsidies for Fossil Fuels and Renewable Energy. International Institute for Sustainable Development.
  4.  Kelkar, V., & Shah, A. (2019). In Service of the Republic. Penguin Random House India.
  5. Mishra, P. (2012, 9). OVERVIEW OF THE POWER SECTOR. PRS Legislative Research.
  6. Samuelson, P. A. (n.d.). Economics (19th ed.). McGraw Hill Education (India) Private Limited.
  7. Ministry of Law and Justice. (2003, June 2). The Electricity Act, 2003 [No.36 of 2003]. Cercind.
  8. Kumar, A. (2020, May 20). Summary of announcements: Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan. PRS Committee Reports.
  9. Choudhary, A. (2018, November 13). Modi’s village electrification is among world’s biggest successes this year, says this report. The Financial Express.

The views expressed in the post are those of the author and in no way reflect those of the ISPP Policy Review or the Indian School of Public Policy. Images via open source.